Cartel destabilization and leniency programs: Empirical evidence

Leniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented since the early nineties. Theoretical work has shown that leniency programs can be effective in enhancing cartel detection and deterrence, but these effects are not straight-forward. It is even possible that there is an increase in the total number of cartels. Empirical evidence shows that the positive effect on cartel deterrence seems to dominate, but cannot provide definite evidence, as inference is derived only by detected cartels. This study uses a more direct measure of success, the intensity of competition at the industry level of OECD countries. An instrumental variable approach, reveals a positive effect on industries' competition intensity of leniency programs indicating effectiveness in cartel destabilization and effective deterrence. --Cartel,Antitrust,Leniency Program

Regulatory practice in the European telecommunications sector: Normative justification and practical application

The telecommunications sector is characterized by economies of scale and scope, high sunk costs, and strong network effects. This combination may facilitate monopolization and abuse of market power. The present study evaluates the need for sector-specific regulation in this sector. It is shown that there is a conflict between static and dynamic efficiency goals. A comparison of two prominent regulatory approaches for the telecommunications sector shows that the disaggregated approach takes account of this conflict most adequately, as it is committed to minimal regulation. The European regulatory framework for electronic communications markets is based on economic theory, and could principally be used to limit regulation to network areas in which stable networkspecific market power is localized. However, especially the criteria for the assessment of significant market power (SMP) are applied too liberally, such that, in practice, overregulation has resulted. --

Cartel destabilization and leniency programs : empirical evidence

Leniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented since the early nineties. Theoretical work has shown that leniency programs can be effective in enhancing cartel detection and deterrence, but these effects are not straight-forward. It is even possible that there is an increase in the total number of cartels. Empirical evidence shows that the positive effect on cartel deterrence seems to dominate, but cannot provide definite evidence, as inference is derived only by detected cartels. This study uses a more direct measure of success, the intensity of competition at the industry level of OECD countries. An instrumental variable approach, reveals a positive effect on industries' competition intensity of leniency programs indicating effectiveness in cartel destabilization and effective deterrence

More bits - more bucks? Measuring the impact of broadband internet on firm performance

The paper provides empirical evidence for the causal impact of broadband Internet on the economic performance of German firms. Performance is measured in terms of labour productivity and realised process and product innovations. The analysis refers to the early phase of DSL expansion in Germany from 2001 to 2003, when roughly 60 percent of the German firms already used broadband Internet. Identification relies on instrumental variable estimation taking advantage of information on the availability of DSL broadband at the postal code level. The results show that broadband Internet has no impact on firms' labour productivity whereas it exhibits a positive and significant impact on their innovation activity. --labour productivity,innovation,broadband Internet

Intermediate input markets, ICT and innovation in Germany: a firm level analysis

This paper studies the impact of the adoption of ICT on the economic performance at the firm level, considering explicitly the interaction of adopting firms within the intermediate input market in Germany. The paper identifies and quantifies the importance of adoption externalities and knowledge spillovers inherent in the introduction of ICT. The results show that the adoption of ICT at the firm level is positively affected by the use of ICT downstream and upstream (i.e. by a firm’s clients and suppliers). Moreover, the use of ICT upstream(i.e. by a firm’s suppliers) negatively affects the extend of IT outsourcing at the firm level, suggesting a substitution effect between inputs provided by suppliers with an intense use of ICT and a firm’s demand for external IT services. The paper also finds that the use of ICT within the intermediate input markets positively affects the efficiency of internal processes by increasing the cost reductions generated by the introduction of process innovations

Endogenous firm heterogeneity, ICT and R&D incentives

Firm heterogeneity explains the productivity driven selection mechanism that determines aggregate productivity growth within industries. This paper empirically demonstrates that ICT has a robust impact on firm heterogeneity only when ICT is used intensively and jointly with specific ICT applications. ICT induced heterogeneity is shown to have a positive impact on the decision to invest in R&D personnel

Regulatory practice in the European telecommunications sector : Normative justification and practical application

The telecommunications sector is characterized by economies of scale and scope, high sunk costs, and strong network effects. This combination may facilitate monopolization and abuse of market power. The present study evaluates the need for sector-specific regulation in this sector. It is shown that there is a conflict between static and dynamic efficiency goals. A comparison of two prominent regulatory approaches for the telecommunications sector shows that the disaggregated approach takes account of this conflict most adequately, as it is committed to minimal regulation. The European regulatory framework for electronic communications markets is based on economic theory, and could principally be used to limit regulation to network areas in which stable networkspecific market power is localized. However, especially the criteria for the assessment of significant market power (SMP) are applied too liberally, such that, in practice, overregulation has resulted

Einschränkungen der Preisgestaltung im Einzelhandel aus wettbewerbsökonomischer Perspektive

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More bits more bucks? : Measuring the impact of broadband internet on firm performance

The paper provides empirical evidence for the causal impact of broadband Internet on the economic performance of German firms. Performance is measured in terms of labour productivity and realised process and product innovations. The analysis refers to the early phase of DSL expansion in Germany from 2001 to 2003, when roughly 60 percent of the German firms already used broadband Internet. Identification relies on instrumental variable estimation taking advantage of information on the availability of DSL broadband at the postal code level. The results show that broadband Internet has no impact on firms' labour productivity whereas it exhibits a positive and significant impact on their innovation activity

Strategic obfuscation and retail pricing

Retailers often stock items that are only slightly differentiated from others??differ- ent sizes of a popular brand, or different ?avors in a common product line for instance. We argue that this practice is a form of strategic obfuscation, intended to raise con- sumer search costs, and margins on non-comparable products. We test our hypothesis using examples from several product categories in German and French retail scanner data. We ?nd that, after controlling for other explanations for how margins can vary with package size, we cannot rule out strategic obfuscation as a feature of our retail sales data